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by Yonah Freemark
yfreemark (at) thetransportpolitic (dot) com

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Reconsidering the Airport Connection: As a Through Station on a Bypass Line

» A station at Heathrow looks more promising when envisioned as a connection between the United Kingdom’s northern and southern rail networks.

In my Friday article on the brewing controversy over whether to link Heathrow Airport to the United Kingdom’s proposed HS2 high-speed rail network, I dismissed the idea rather quickly, arguing that the airport station proposed by the Conservative Party would multiply construction costs and increase travel times. Because Heathrow is not directly on the way between London and Birmingham, including a station at the airport on the first segment of the HS2 route would be a wasteful choice. The Labour Party’s inclination to have airport users transfer to another line to get to terminals is probably the right approach.

Yet, after reading a report on the Heathrow connection by high-speed rail advocacy group Greengauge 21 (thanks to commenter John W), I’d like to modify my position on the issue.

By integrating Heathrow Airport into a bypass route around London, it would become an essential element of the nation’s high-speed network by allowing commuters to make cross-country connections without entering the capital. This link could provide fast train access to much of southwestern England and southern Wales, two regions which thus far have been excluded from consideration for new service.

The Greengauge 21 project promotes its concept in opposition to the three primary options that have typically been proposed for a Heathrow connection: a spur line terminating at the airport, which would suffer from low frequencies (as suggested in Greengauge 21’s first plan in 2007); a required transfer from a station elsewhere that would reduce rail use at the airport significantly (as suggested by Labour); and a remote hub along the London-Birmingham route that would extend journey times and costs (as suggested by the Conservatives).

Greengauge 21 argues that there is no reason to reroute the London-Birmingham route, since that would limit the ridership to be gained from the fastest-possible journeys between London and the north. But by constructing that first stage of the HS2 route with plans for turnouts towards the airport from the beginning, the U.K. could be setting the stage for direct airport access and future fast train service along the South Western Main Line and the Great Western Main Line. The former corridor could handle high-speed trains today, while the latter is planned for electrification over the next decade.

This proposal would create a £3.2 billion London bypass modeled on France’s LGV Interconnexion Est, which runs to the east of Paris, serving Charles de Gaulle Airport on the way. Interestingly, SNCF, the French rail company, proposed a similar line around Chicago via O’Hare Airport in its proposal for a Midwest high-speed rail system several months back.

The French model is worthy of serious consideration as the British implement their own rail improvements. Until the Interconnexion was completed in 1994, customers hoping to take high-speed trains between regional cities were required to transfer in Paris, often even having to get between stations on opposite sides of the city. This lowered ridership significantly, as the time advantage of high-speed trains are lost when major transfers are necessary. But the Interconnexion allowed trains to travel directly from the southeast and southwest to the east and north, allowing people in Lille, for instance, to get to Lyon without changing trains: there are now ten direct trains between those cities everyday.

The fact that the Interconnexion includes a station at Charles de Gaulle Airport (and Disneyland Paris, for that matter) is secondary to the line’s role as a connection between regions. The fact that the airport station is able to attract 3.4 million TGV users a year, no small number (it would be Amtrak’s fourth most-used station), is an added advantage. Virtually none of those riders are coming from the Paris region.

Heathrow could play a similar essential connecting role between the HS2 corridor and the southwestern sections of the United Kingdom, allowing people in cities along the high-speed line like Birmingham and Manchester direct service to Cardiff, Bristol, and Portsmouth, which may not get a new dedicated high-speed line but could at least see high-speed trains. The airport becomes a through-station, with most trains passing through in the middle of a longer cross-country trip. Greengauge 21 argues that this strategy could attract 15 million passengers a year to Heathrow’s high-speed station by 2055.

The primary goal of the HS2 project should be first to connect London to Glasgow and Edinborough city centers in about two hours. This project would provoke a major mode shift towards rail across the country. The construction of a link to Heathrow wouldn’t reduce the airport’s congestion much since only about 10% of passenger movements at Heathrow could be realistically moved to rail and only six British cities currently have directly flights to the airport anyway.

Yet taking advantage of the airport to build a new bypass around London would play a more important role in reducing road travel on routes not involving London, with a movement away from flying as only a secondary, complementary effect. If constructing that bypass becomes a priority in the future, routing it through the airport could be the right approach — and British rail planners should be designing HS2 now to be ready for it.

Image above: Greengauge 21’s Heathrow Opportunity Plan, from Greengauge 21

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High-Speed Rail's Airport Connection

» The British government is set to produce a high-speed plan that does not include a direct connection to Heathrow Airport. Is that a problem?

It’s one of the standard arguments made by promoters of high-speed rail: by investing in multimodal hubs at airports, trains can reduce congestion in the air by encouraging people flying short journeys to switch to rail, even while expanding access to long-distance routes only feasible by airplane. The argument is lapped up by politicians and business groups, both of whom use air travel far more frequently than the average population. The two most advanced plans for American fast train services will include direct connections to airports: in Florida at Orlando and in California at San Francisco, San Diego, Ontario, and Palmdale.

Yet the British government is planning to release a report next week that will advocate bypassing Heathrow Airport, the world’s second largest, on the way between London and Birmingham. To be completed by 2025, this corridor would be the first segment of what will eventually be a north-south high-speed mainline between the English Channel and Scotland. The full £60 billion High-Speed 2 project, it seems, will prioritize center-city connections over air links.

Is that an acceptable position?

The question of whether to route HS2 through the airport has become a prime source of political argument in the United Kingdom, which is likely to vote in national elections in the next few months. The Conservatives, currently in opposition, have been pushing a fast rail link for more than a year, claiming that it would help reduce congestion at Heathrow. Until recently, the ruling Labour Party had been less committed to the project but over the past few months it has invested considerable sums in initial planning for the line, hoping that it will be a popular policy and improve its political chances.

Now that the north-south link has support on both sides of the political spectrum (as well as a promise of financial help), 220 mph trains running from London Euston Station to Birmingham, Manchester, and Edinburgh in just over two hours seem inevitable within the next few decades.

But one major point of contention has been over the future of Heathrow. The airport is over-congested with only two runways despite its high traffic (Atlanta’s Hartsfield-Jackson, the world’s busiest airport, has five runways), so its owner BAA has asked for the right to construct a third runway, a position endorsed by Labour but opposed by the Tories, who want most future domestic travel to be by rail. Labour leaders, led by Secretary of State for Transport Andrew Adonis, have suggested that both the third runway and the high-speed system be built.

The peculiar extension of this controversy is that Tories are now pushing for a high-speed hub near Heathrow that would allow commuters from the north to make easy connections to international flights. Labour leaders, however, will pronounce in next week’s report that there is no business case for a hub at the airport and suggest that train riders hoping to get to flights would be able to connect quickly enough to the Crossrail commuter rail line currently under construction.

The Tories have announced that they will not support the government’s plan for the high-speed train’s route and reserve the right to alter plans if they are to win the election. Polls, which showed massive leads for the conservatives just months ago, now show a tight race for control of Parliament.

It’s not clear whether the Tory or Labour strategy would be more effective in reducing the number of passengers choosing to fly between domestic destinations in the United Kingdom. BAA has announced its support for a direct link to the airport because it assumes it would actually increase traffic, the exact opposite of the argument made by the Tories, who think that an easy connection would encourage people to take the train.

On the other hand, BAA officials might be worried that Birmingham Airport, also planned for a stop on the initial HS2 link, could benefit from a redistribute international air traffic in the country.

But the most important question is whether it’s worth aligning a high-speed route specifically to provide a station at an airport, even if it slows  city-to-city services. It’s a move that has been made previously by France with its TGV links to Paris and Lyon airports (pictured above), and by Germany, whose Stuttgart 21 project will provide direct ICE trains to that city’s airport.

Opened in 1994, Lyon’s airport link has been relatively successful with 400,000 annual passengers, but that’s minor compared to a typical city station, such as the suburban Avignon TGV station, which attracts 2.2 million a year — more than every American Amtrak station except for those in New York, Washington, Philadelphia, and Chicago. There’s a reasonable explanation for the low ridership at Lyon: customers using the same TGV line also have a connection to Paris-CDG, a much larger airport with more flights. The two TGV stations in central Lyon are also more convenient to most residents of the region via public transportation than the airport stop.

Should countries like Britain considering high-speed rail invest limited funds in airport stops?

One thing that’s worth considering is that airport fast rail links are not really designed for passengers who live in the nearest large cities. Newark Airport, which has almost twice as many annual users as BWI Airport in Maryland, nonetheless has 1/6th of its Amtrak ridership, at only 110,000 a year. That’s because the vast majority of people coming from New York City and other nearby destinations used NJ Transit commuter rail. The higher Amtrak user counts at BWI are likely a result of relatively poor MARC commuter rail service. People don’t use (or, rather, pay for) fast intercity rail from the center city to the airport just a few miles away when they have alternatives.

London Heathrow offers metro and commuter rail services today and will get Crossrail regional rail operations within the decade.

Most airport users come from the surrounding region. On the other hand, high-speed rail will for the most part only serve connecting passengers coming from medium-sized cities within a 200 to 300-mile radius but which lack direct public transportation access to the airport — a relatively limited market, especially since there are other, growing airports further afield, and London Heathrow has no room for more traffic.

Most people in Birmingham would like to use their local airport to get to continental Europe, and there’s no reason why such services should be monopolized by London. The primary purpose of HS2, meanwhile, will be to allow inhabitants of Birmingham and other cities direct access into London, not via London. It’s hard to see how airport/high-speed rail connections address those facts.

Heathrow may be a different case, as it is by far the U.K.’s largest airport. Perhaps a rail station there would be considerably more successful in attracting customers, making it worthy of investment. If airlines were better at integrating train tickets into their reservation systems, people arriving at Heathrow from abroad would be able to switch easily to trains heading north to Birmingham or Manchester. But that would only be possible if HS2 is designed with airlines in mind and in agreement with those air carriers, not necessarily possible considering their clear conflict of interest.

These issues apply to any proposed airport connection for a high-speed rail system.

Ultimately, though, this discussion may be irrelevant to the U.K. Even the Tory plan wouldn’t provide direct terminal access to Heathrow; customers would still have to transfer to another train or bus to get to gates. Since that’s true, it’s hard to identify a major problem with the Labour plan, which would be cheaper to build, faster to ride, and also provide a one-transfer link to the airport.

Image above: TGV Station at Lyon-St. Exupéry, from Flickr User Bicycle Bob

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New York Plans Transitway on 34th Street, but It's Not BRT, for Better or Worse

» The project represents a marked advance for a city that’s been reluctant to invest in fully separated lanes for its buses.

When American transit planners begin working on a new transit capital project, they’re often required to undertake what’s called an alternative analysis, a study whose purpose is to identify the appropriate route and technology for a specific corridor. It’s an open secret among people in the industry that while these reports often provide useful information about where exactly to place a new line, the choice of vehicle mode is almost always predetermined.

This leads to a sometimes bizarre situation in which, for instance, a city planning a one-mile extension of its rapid transit lines “considers” whether high-speed rail or local buses might work in the same corridor — even though everyone knows that if the money ever shows up, the rapid transit line will be the only thing built. The process, in other words, is often a charade.

Such was the case recently for New York City, whose Department of Transportation is intent on improving the public transportation offerings in Midtown Manhattan, the nation’s largest business district. Despite the fact that the DOT has been on an all-out crusade to improve bus service, has no money for more subways, and has demonstrated little interest in light rail or streetcars, it evaluated all four in its recent study for the 34th Street corridor. It threw in an elevated automated people mover for consideration as well in case anyone cared.

Unsurprisingly, the report advocated the construction of a bus transitway along the route.

None of this is to suggest that improving bus operations in Midtown is a bad idea. Rather, it’s sometimes worth considering the hoops through which transit agencies must jump in order to bring their visions to fruition.

But the alternatives analysis did allow New York City’s DOT to demonstrate why it considers a dedicated transitway for bus service to be the ideal technology candidate for the two-mile 34th street corridor, running river to river. The mode allows the use of existing vehicles and the through-routing of express buses from elsewhere in the city — something not possible had streetcars or light rail been chosen. It would also be relatively cheap to implement, at between $30 and 125 million, versus $250 million and up for light rail or several billion for a full-scale subway line.

The transitway would allow commuters to get across the city 35% faster than possible today, cutting transit times to 20 minutes, just slightly longer than would be feasible with a light rail line.

For this heavily foot-trafficked street, New York City is proposing something nice: wider sidewalks, a pedestrian plaza between Fifth and Sixth Avenues, and increased public facilities with new station canopies.

It’s a significantly improved plan over the previously revealed project for First and Second Avenues, which will separate each direction of bus service onto two separate streets and do little to curb the intrusion of other vehicles into the busway. With a clear separation between cars and buses this time, the city is likely to actually improve service levels.

One thing the transitway is not, however, is bus rapid transit, despite the DOT’s continued use of the word to describe what it wants to build on 34th Street. With 13 stations end to end — roughly every 800 feet — buses will average a miserable six miles per hour, hardly faster than a person can walk the route.

Some may argue that a light rail line would be more appropriate — perhaps as part of a tramway loop including 42nd Street — but similar proposals for that technology would feature equally abysmal transit times because of the high number of stops deemed necessary. Rail would face the additional stumbling block caused by the fact that overhead catenary has been illegal in Manhattan since the devastating 1888 blizzard, which shut down the city’s elevated transportation system.

There are also plenty of congested corridors around the city that arguably need better transit far sooner than Midtown Manhattan, which is replete with subway lines.

But the DOT’s efforts are about more than moving buses through the city more quickly: it’s apparent that the 34th Street plan is as much aimed to improve the streetscape for pedestrians, who until recently have been put in last place by New York City decision-making. With the possible exception of 125th Street, there are few corridors in Manhattan that are more used by walkers, since 34th is a shopper’s paradise.

If that’s what it is, though, New York should be clear in its intentions: this isn’t really bus rapid transit, it’s a way to improve the function of the street for everyone.

Image above: Map of proposed 34th Street bus transit services, from New York City DOT

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Wisconsin Moves Ahead with Train Purchase Deal, Intent on Connecting Madison with Milwaukee

» Talgo will establish train manufacturing plant in Milwaukee. But state Republicans suggest they’ll oppose rail expansion if it gets in the way of highway spending.

Despite being a marginal player in the world high-speed rail market, Spanish train manufacturer Talgo is hoping to make a big push for orders in  North America. Thanks to a deal it signed with Wisconsin last year, it’s well on its way: The company has agreed to locate a new U.S. plant in Milwaukee, with plans to deliver 125 mph trains to the state for service to Madison by 2013.

If state Republicans gain power, however, the state’s rail efforts could be short-lived.

Under the leadership of outgoing Democratic Governor Jim Doyle, the Badger State has been one of the country’s leaders in developing improved rail service. The Governor announced last March that he would move forward with a plan to expand services between Chicago and Milwaukee,and reopen the passenger link to Madison. Future services could be offered to Green Bay. Later in 2009, Mr. Doyle signed a deal with Talgo to buy two 14-car trains for train operations, in exchange for that company’s commitment to locate a new plant within the state.

Wisconsin’s investment was rewarded by the U.S. Department of Transportation in January, which announced $810 million for the Madison-Milwaukee line, enough to have 79 mph trains operating along the 85-mile line within three years. The corridor would be upgraded to 110 mph by 2015.

Talgo announced this week that it would build its plant in a former automotive facility in Milwaukee, eventually creating about 75 jobs there. The State of Oregon revealed today that it would buy two additional 125 mph 13-car trains for its Eugene-Vancouver services, bringing total Talgo orders to about $85 million from the Wisconsin plant, a significant first step for the ambitious Spanish concern. As of now, the plant will build only Series VIII trainsets, which are fully compliant with Federal Railroad Administration rules and operate using diesel propulsion. This train is not what would be considered a truly high-speed train in other countries.

Yet as an initial response to a desire for increasing rail services, the deal seems like a good one for Wisconsin. Not only will it get new trains, but it will also get manufacturing jobs, which it has been losing for decades.

With Democratic majorities in both the State Assembly and Senate, lawmakers approved the deal with the federal government last month along partisan lines. The GOP suggested that Wisconsin shouldn’t be saddled with the operating costs of the new corridor, which would start at around $7.5 million a year. This line of reasoning is similar to that expressed by Ohio Republicans, who similarly claim to be willing to reject federal funds for improved rail service if the state is asked to subsidize operations costs.

Republican gubernatorial candidate front-runner Scott Walker is taking a hard line against the Milwaukee-Madison project, claiming that he would shut down the corridor “if it takes money away from new-and-improved roads.” Another candidate, Mark Neumann, is also critical of the program, arguing that tax cuts would be a better use of public funds and that “if high speed rail were economically sound it would already have been built by the private sector.”

Democratic candidate Tom Barrett, the Mayor of Milwaukee, is a big supporter of the project as he claims it would serve as an economic stimulus for the troubled state. He also has made the quite legitimate claim that Wisconsin will have already spent $57 million on preliminary construction activity by the time the next governor is sworn in — it doesn’t make much since to pull out once so much money has already been invested.

Both Republicans are currently leading Mr. Barrett in polls in advance of the November election.

One could argue about the specific merits of the Milwaukee-Madison service, but the considerable success of Amtrak’s Hiawatha Service between Chicago and Milwaukee — it has the third highest ridership per mile of U.S. intercity rail routes after the Northeast Regional and Capitol Corridor lines — suggests that Wisconsin’s population is well prepared for improved rail operations.

Just as in Ohio, Republican objections in Wisconsin are difficult to take seriously, because they’re incoherent. Why is it problematic for the government to sponsor rail construction when highways aren’t built by the private sector either? Why should roads always be prioritized in state spending, when trains are used by thousands of people each day too? More importantly, why is it that the first serious investment in passenger rail service Wisconsin has seen in decades is immediately greeted with skepticism, while road spending continues apace in the state, at more than $2 billion a year?

Nonetheless, Wisconsin’s rail investments are likely to move forward — the public has demonstrated clear support for the mode over the years, and there have been plenty of Republicans in the state, including former Governor Tommy Thompson, who have been serious proponents of new train services. But the increasingly hysterical GOP fear of investing in transportation projects that aren’t automobile-oriented may come to pose a mounting obstacle, in Wisconsin and beyond.

Image above: Talgo Series VIII Train, from Talgo

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As SNCF Loses Its Public Focus, the Future of French Rail is in Question

» As Europe pushes competition in the railway sector, the role of the public enterprise slowly fades away.

The first threat came earlier this year, when French national railway operator SNCF signaled that it was considering cutting some TGV high-speed train routes between the nation’s regional capitals. Facing increasing track use fees and the economic recession, one in five TGV services now lose money, and SNCF seemed ready to stop operating direct services from Bordeaux, Nantes, and Lille to Strasbourg. Many people hoping to travel from destinations in the eastern part of the country to the west would have to transfer in Paris.

Still under the control of the French government, however, SNCF announced that no TGV services would be cut, and that the rail company would have to find ways to increase ridership or cut services elsewhere. For regional officials across the country, this was a relief, a sign that the nation’s rail transport would continue to serve as an engine for universal mobility, not simply for the movement of Parisians.

Yet with European regulations altering the role of the public railway across the continent, the decision the SNCF almost made no longer appears like an aberration — rather, it probably will be the future norm. That’s because European regulators, focused on increasing competition in areas of former public monopoly, have asked SNCF to abandon its public enterprise status by July 2010, or the French government will be penalized for handing out an illegal subsidy. With France’s formerly publicly owned gas, electricity, and aviation companies now private, the pseudo-privatization of SNCF would be just another example of the liberalization of trade in what can only be described as a now market-obsessed Europe.

With none of the public and political pressure to maintain high-speed service between regional capitals, SNCF seems likely to move away from any operations that aren’t money-making once it separates fully from the public envelope. The result will be a general decline in service along less-used routes — a depressing outcome for a system that has developed so well over the past few decades.

Because of decrees by the Brussels-based European Union, France no longer has the ability to make independent decisions about how to operate its railways but instead must follow free-competition rules supposedly designed to improve the efficiencies of the railway market and reduce fares for customers. This represents major a change, especially in France.

The rail network was once operated under public monopolies across Europe, with national operators controlling each individual market and international routes the subject of intense negotiation and agreements between countries. This system had a number of benefits, notably in France, where SNCF was conceived as a service providing more than simply transportation, but also societal equalization, befitting its designation as a public enterprise. The company has reduced fares for children, young adults, seniors, and large families — as a matter of social concern. The operator offers high-speed tickets at cheap prices compared to comparable services in Germany, Spain, or Italy — a policy that has resulted in highly frequented TGV trains and a general equality in train service for people of all income classes. There are no slow, poor-person trains on routes where TGVs are offered.

The lack of competition also allowed SNCF to transfer profits from its TGVs to subsidize Corail routes, which provide national intercity services on routes that don’t yet offer high-speed trains.

But the success of the SNCF in running the French railway network has not been adequately appreciated by European officials (or by conservative French President Nicolas Sarkozy), who have made a conscious decision to emulate the British rail system, which has been open to competition since 1994. That network, in which track ownership (sometimes public, sometime private) is separated from private train operations, has extensive failings. An effort to use public-private partnerships to construct the United Kingdom’s first high-speed line resulted in a bankruptcy in which the state had to bailout the creditors and take the losses. The recession pulled several private operators out of business, leaving the state to take command of several money-losing routes.

It’s hard to see the British example as anything other than a racket designed to transfer profits into the private sector and force the public sphere to absorb losses. And yet European officials are adamant that the continent’s more successful rail systems follow in its example.

France made the first step in that direction in early 1997 with the creation of the public Réseau Ferré de France, which took control of the nation’s rail network from SNCF, leaving the company involved in operations alone, paying RFF for the rights to use tracks and opening the way for competition from other companies. This allowed SNCF to make large profits, since it was no longer required to take on debt for the construction of expensive new rail lines. But the creation of RFF immediately established a conflict of interest between operator and track owner: one is intent on paying back the costs of high-speed lines, whereas the other has pursued a socially equitable policy in the distribution of transportation resources.

As a result, RFF has been increasing track use fees significantly over the past few years. As a bureaucrat at SNCF put it: “We’re stuck: we’re asked to make money. But the tolls paid to RFF to run TGV services keep going up. At the same time, we’re asked to keep running trains, even when they lose money.” Between 2005 and 2013, RFF will increase SNCF track fees from €1 billion to €2.2 billion, enough to destroy the operator’s profit and eventually push it into bankruptcy unless the government comes to its aid — unlikely considering European regulations. RFF, meanwhile, made a profit in 2009.

At the same time, SNCF faces increasing competition from private and foreign operators that plan to make a play for the lucrative French market beginning as early as this year. They are expected to be able to offer competitive services because their employees lack the employment protections and good pay SNCF workers have earned after years of negotiations and strikes. That said, these competitors will have significant start-up costs, including the not-exactly-cheap purchase of new high-speed trains.

The French government has made a commitment to aid the company whose days as a public protectorate seem short-lived. Money-losing Corail trains, which cost SNCF €150 million a year, are to be contracted out to SNCF by the state, similar to the way the TER regional rail operations are now run by each of France’s 22 regions. This will make the company’s only non-governmental services the TGV lines.

Because of the RFF’s high track fees, a newly profit-motivated SNCF is likely to abandon corridors that are marginal, including those region-to-region routes that almost saw the axe this year; most TGV services seem likely to be relegated to routes with destinations in Paris, Lyon, or Marseille, the country’s three biggest cities. This in spite of the fact that many peripheral regions expected to see declining services contributed directly to the construction of new high-speed lines. But now that RFF and SNCF have completely opposing motivations, it doesn’t matter, since track construction ownership is separated from operations. Regions can no longer assume service expansion to be the expected result of investing in new routes.

In addition, SNCF seems unlikely to continue offering the deep discounts to the young and old it can currently provide, since it will now be focused on providing more expensive profit-building business trips between the country’s biggest cities, routes that will face increasing competition from other operators in the future. If those benefits are to be extended, they will have to be subsidized by the state.

In many ways, these new European regulations put into question the French model of social equity in rail services; the manner in which competition is being pursued will fundamentally transform the role and goals of the SNCF. It’s difficult to conceive of a way in which this will produce general improvements in service for the country’s population.

Image above: Paris’ Gare de Lyon, from Flickr User Nojhan, under a CC 2.0 License

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How Feasible is Antonio Villaraigosa's 30/10 Gambit for Los Angeles Transit?

» Mayor of nation’s second-largest city fights to advance city’s transit planning… by twenty years. It’s a job that necessitates a national infrastructure bank that does not yet exist.

Forget that old cliché about Los Angeles. It’s not the old highway-obsessed metropolis it used to be. In fact, as L.A. matures, it’s densifying, shedding its abhorrence towards public transportation.

The region already has one of the most ambitious transit expansion plans in the country; a new light rail line to East L.A. opened last year, the Expo light rail line from downtown to Culver City is under construction, and dozens of other routes are in planning throughout Los Angeles County. The passage in November 2008 of Measure R, an additional half-cent sales tax for transit, means that these projects aren’t just conjectural.

But L.A. Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa, who has always been a strong proponent of new rail and bus lines, isn’t satisfied by the thirty-year timetable that will be required to complete the projects lined up for $13.7 billion in local funding. (Measure R would also fund $27 billion in transit operations, maintenance, and roads projects.) Current financial assumptions indicate that the Mayor’s highest priority–an extension of the Westside subway (Purple Line) to Westwood–wouldn’t be complete until 2032. A fixed guideway link along I-405 between the San Fernando Valley and UCLA would have to wait until 2038.

For Mr. Villaraigosa, this situation isn’t feasible: he wants his subway as soon as possible, rather than force his city’s inhabitants to spend decades more in congestion. But over ten years, Measure R is only expected to bring in about $3 billion for transit capital projects–enough to build the first phase of the subway, but nothing else. Because the Metropolitan Transportation Authority represents L.A. County’s ten million inhabitants, not just the city’s four million, prioritizing a line that would provide service to a tiny percentage of the region’s overall geographic area would not be politically feasible.

In October last year, the mayor suggested an alternative: ask the federal government to loan Metro billions of dollars to complete the majority of the county’s transit projects, in the city and out, in ten years, rather then thirty. The transit authority would then pay Washington back for twenty more years as revenues from Measure R trickled in.

The 30/10 proposal would allow Metro to construct the full Westside extension, but also two easterly extensions of the Gold Line, two new branches for the Green Line, several busways in San Fernando Valley, a link along I-405, and new light rail lines downtown, along Crenshaw Boulevard, to Santa Monica, and via the West Santa Ana branch corridor. All by 2020.

It was a brilliant solution to an intractable political problem by ensuring the extension of transit in corridors everywhere in the county within a tight time frame. The fight over which lines to prioritize would simply not have to happen.

This “big bang” strategy would not only dramatically improve the city’s public transportation system by opening rapid transit lines to areas of the county previously ignored, but also act as a stimulus for hundreds of thousands of construction workers currently out of work. But who in Washington would be ready to make such a deal? How serious was the mayor anyhow?

Considering the Mayor’s schedule over the past several weeks, it appears he’s dead-set on the proposal. Last week, he went to Washington to garner the support of several members of Congress, and got it, including from influential Oregon Democratic Representative Peter DeFazio, who chairs the House Subcommittee on Highways and Transit. California Democratic Senator Barbara Boxer, who is currently running for reelection, announced that she would support the effort. Secretary of Transportation Ray LaHood signaled that he was open to the opportunity in a meeting in Los Angeles last month.

If the city is able to move forward on the 30/10 project, it will set quite an intriguing precedent for the dozens of other cities across the country currently considering major transit expansion proposals. The multi-billion-dollar bridge loan Mr. Villaraigosa hopes to have handed over to Metro would be a unique solution to a problem caused by limited short-term revenues. And it implies that Washington should get into the game of agreeing to act as an investment bank for municipalities that can guarantee a source of income over the long term.

If anything, L.A.’s proposal is the best example yet of a project that could really take advantage of a national infrastructure bank, which could provide low-interest loans to governmental agencies to pursue major projects of future importance. The bank would be able to rely on Measure R as an assurance that it will eventually get its money back, and L.A. will be able to benefit from a quick advancement of its rail and bus systems, creating a veritable rapid transit network that in the United States would rival only New York’s in route length.

But the national infrastructure bank does not yet exist. Nor does the Federal Transit Administration have the funds or mandate to pursue a similar policy. So, unless Congress acts on its own, Los Angeles’ transit plans will continue to be relegated to a thirty-year timetable.

Today, with one senator blocking funding for the Department of Transportation and 2,000 workers currently furloughed, it seems unlikely that politicians in Washington will be able to get their together well enough to fund transit at standard levels, let alone sponsor a national infrastructure bank.

That’s a disappointment, since the twelve projects Mayor Villaraigosa has selected for investment would each contribute to the creation of a strong transit system in America’s second city, something that’s been sorely lacking for decades.

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